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1. SUMMARY: Judgment was entered in this§ 1983 action 
rMI\ iM,o•. 1'.Y 
~~ A '-..L of 
,. f\ (s -::----_:.::=-:.:.:~~~~ 
lf\A)T~ 
the DC (SD Ohio, Hogan) against petr school board in favor 
J ~ 
resp ~on-tenured teacher for reinstatement, damages, and 
the finding that a non-permissible reason -






in petr's decision not to renew resp's contract. CA 6 in a 
brief PC found the decision supported by substantial evidence, 
and affirmed all but the award of attorney's fees, which it 
vacated under Alyeska. 
2. FACTS: Resp started teaching business in high school 
in 1966, at age 24, later acquiring an MA. His non-tenured 
contract was renewed each year up through 70-71. By petr's 
April 1971 decision, resp was not renewed for 71-72;.!/he sued 
in July 1971 (naming the Board; its members, officially and 
individually; and likewise the superintendent). Resp claimed 
1st Amendment; petr claimed the non-renewal was based on "im-
maturity" and lack of "tact." The DC canvassed the facts in 
full detail, finding: 
-
(a) Resp had a very good record as teacher and as contributor 
to the school's extra-curricular activities, etc; he had in 1969-
70 been president of teacher's association (Assn), which came to 
be the collective agent for various teacher vs. board problems. 
fk"'-t '-IUt r--
The Assn haggledAwith school officials over procedural aspects 
of bargaining, culminating in a strike threat, in Feb. 1970. 
Out of this arose the "Hinkle" incident: Hinkle, a fellow 
teacher, slapped resp during a heated argument (having to do 
.!/A renewal in the spring of 1971 for the year 71-72 would have 
automatically given resp tenure under state law; resp makes no 






with some decision resp made as leader of the Assn); resp refused 
to accept the apology, wanting to take his case beyond the 
principal to the superintendent and the Board; the next school 
day, both were "suspended", i.e., sent home to cool off; and the 
teachers then walked out. The suspensions were lifted, and the 
incident apparently became a catalyst to break the negotiating 
impasse - the Board and the Assn reached an agreement. 
(b) Five other incidents occurred between Feb. 1970 and 
April 1971, as labeled and found by the DC: (1) "direct dealing" -
at one point resp arranged a negotiating meeting between the 
Assn "team" ·and the Board, but in fact most of the Assn members 
showed up, upsetting the Board, especially one who was an AFL-
CIO member in his occupation; (2) "spaghetti" - resp hassled the 
school cafeteria help over the paucity of his portion, calling 
them "stupid"; resp subsequently apologized, publicly, when they 
complained to the principal; (3) "sons of bitches" - after 
bringing 4 boys to the asst principal for djscipline, resp refer-
red to them as such (4) "gesture" - resp, as lunchtime supervisor, 
was hustling students out of the cafeteria to clear it for the 
next period; an argument ensued with some girls over their 
deliberate "slowdown," culminating in a 2-fingered gesture by 
resp (student translation: "bullshit"), to which the gj rls 
responded with the well-known middle finger. Resp later apologjzed 






in Feb. 1971, the principal circulated a "mild" 1 and 1/2 page 
memo on teacher dress and appearance; resp called it to the 
attention of a youth-oriented radio station in Cincinnati, which 
repeated the memo's substance over the air with "comment that 
might be expected '. ' from such a station (the DC does not elaborate). 
The memo was prompted by the principal's concern for public sup-
port for the bond issues.Ythe principal, guessing it was resp, 
called him on the carpet; resp apologized, agreeing that it would 
have been better to criticize the memo internally first. 
(c) The Superintendent made his usual yearly evaluations and 
( 
recommendations to the Board in March 1971, according to which 
petr and several others were not renewed. Two weeks after resp 
was notified, and after he requested a statement of reasons, the 
superintendent sent a written statement citing a "lack of tact" 
and giving as examples the "radio" incident and the "gesture" 
. 'd ll 1.nc1. ent. 
(d) The fact that several other Assn-active teachers, one 
of whom was likewise non-tenured, were contract renewed, 
indicated that resp's Assn activities were not related to the 
non-renewal¥ 
...--.__ 
-r ._. swwwss ... - - - ... 
1/The DC specifically found that the relationship between public 
support for bonds and teachers' dress was established by the reco rd . 
l/The DC noted that under Ohio law a non-tenured teacher may be 
denied re-employment for no reason at all. Petn lla. 
1/The DC noted that while the Assn had gone on strike over resp's 







(e) Resp had since taught elsewhere for 3 years, at a 
slightly lower salary, the differential being some $5,000. 
(f) Under Ohio law, the "State" does not include political 
subdivisions; the Board is a "political subdivision" and as s uch 
is "capable of suing and being sued." Ohio Code, petn 20a-2la . 
The Board members are "state officers." There was no malice , 
- I ~----
this being a case of "some permissible and some not permissible" 
"moving causes." 
The DC, citing other lower courts, reasoned that if "a non-
permissible reason ••• played a substantial part in the decision 
not to renew - even in the face of other permissible grounds -
the decision may not stand." That such was involved here was 
clear from the superintendent's letter to resp, with one of the 
2 examples of lack of "tact" being the "clearly protected" call 
to the radio station. The Board members, as "individuals", were 
dismissed, as was the superintendent. As to the claim that the 
~of 
Board,™ Board, wasAsuable under§ 1983, City of Kenosha v. 
Bruno, 412 U.S • . 507 (1973), that need not be addressed because 
the case comes properly within 28 u.s.c. § 1331. There are no 
11th Amendment problems since the state statute supplies the 
necessary "waiver." Judgment for reinstatement, damages, and 
attorney's fees was entered against the "Mt. Healthy School Board of 






CA 6, affirming all but the attorney's fees, stated simply 
that substantial evidence supported the finding that petr's 
non-renewal action "was motivated at least in part" by resp's 
"action in informing a local radio station of an 'appropriate 
dress code' suggested for teachers", and the DC did not err in 
concluding that the refusal was "based on a constitutionally 
impermissible reason." 
3. CONTENTIONS: (a) Petr: the DC had no jurisdiction over 
the "Board": (i) the Board is not a person under § 1983 (citing 
numerous CA & DC decisions so holding under Monroe v. Pape) (ii) 
rest, 
whileAclaimed $50,000 punitive damages, reinstatement (with back 
pay), and attorney's fees, the first and the third were disal-
lowed, and the value of reinstatement at the time suit was filed 
could not have exceeded $10,000 since by then resp had already 
secured another job - the most he could properly claim was the 
differential. Thus§ 1331 jurisdiction was lacking. Resp: 
there is no need to argue the§ 1983 point, since his well-
pleaded complaint clearly claimed in excess of $10,000. 
f 11th 
~ with 
(b) Petr: The Board is immune from money damages under the 
Amendment. Resp: the Board is a local political subdivision, 
much autonomy vis-a-vis the State; the majority of school 
district funds derive from local property taxes, so there is no 






(c) Petr: the DC took the wrong view of the letter, which 
was written by the superintendent, not the Board, and expressly 
cited resp's "notable lack of tact in handling professional 
matters"; only one of the 2 illustrations implicated the pjrst 
Amendment. All the Board members testified that their votes 
were not in any way colored by resp's 1st Amentment activity. 
Resp: aligns with the DC's facts. 
(d) Petr: the CA 6 standard - "motivated at least in part" -
conflicts with other CAs, in that all have required that the 
constitutionally impermissible reason play a substantial part 
in the non-renewal. Resp: However CA 6 might have rephrased it, 
the DC used the "substantial part" test 
on the facts. 
nef 
4. DISCUSSION: The is certworthy, 
have ruled that a for many, if not most, of the CAs and 
school board is like a county or city purposes of suit under 
§ 1983. Most have gotten around the ~ imitation, however, by ,__ -
holding that the . members thereof, in ~heir official capacities, 
are "persons" against whom equitable ~nd damage relief may be 
entered, a fiction akin to the "disti~ tion" drawn in Ex parte 
Young. The underlying fear, of course ~ is that if no relief 
under§ 1983 can be directed against a lboard ~ board, nor 
( 
against its members "officially", some / 22 years of desegregation 






to imply a cause of action under the 14th Amendment, together with 
§ 1331, then the rulings as to "person" in§ 1983 in Monroe and 
City of Kenosha are rather easily circumvented .• 
Here, the lower cts simply held the Board suable as such, 
so the use of the "official capacity" fiction for reaching the 
same result against its members is arguably not presented, 
although to me the 2 would seem almost inseparable. I note that 
the same question is presented in Bd. of Junior College Dist. v. 
Hostrop, striken from Mar. 19 Conf., No. 75-1035, although 
perhaps not as clearly. Caveat: While petr in his argumerrt:___---
headings does state that the DC "does not have jurisdiction of 
this matter", its§ 1331 argument is only that the jurisdictional 
~ 
amount was not satisfied, and not that§ 1331 cannot be used 
because there can be no implied cause of action under the 14th 
Amendment against the Board. I would think petr has preserved 
all aspects of§ 1983 and§ 1331 jurisdiction, though not 
articulated. 
Merits. The case is perhaps independently certworthy on 
the question of the proper standard. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 
391 U.S. 563 (1968), does not specifically address the question. 
CA 6's affirming language - "motivated at least in part" - is 







troubling, and as such creates a conflict with the "substantia l 
part" test; the plethora of cases in this area makes the que st ion 
a significant one. 
Resp appears correct on the 11th Amendment question. 
There is a response. 
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No. 75-1278, Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education 
v. Doyle. 
This memorandum, dictated after a preliminary look at 
the briefs, is intended only as an "aid to memory" that will 
refresh my recollection when I return to a more careful study 
of the case prior to argument and decision. When an opinion is 
expressed or intimated, it is wholly tentative. 
* * * * * 
The contract of respondent, a 29-year-old non-tenured 
public school teacher, was not renewed by petitioner (the School 
Board). If the contract had been renewed, in view of his having 
served four years already, he would have acquired tenure under 
Ohio law. Respondent was notified, by a two-sentence letter dated 
April 2, 1971, that the Board "will not extend to you a contract 
for teaching in the 1971-72 school year." (Exhibit No. 4, A. 287.) 
Respondent then requested reasons for the non-renewal, and the 




- -No. 75-1278 2. 
You have shown a notable lack of tact in handling 
professional matters which leaves much doubt as 
to your sincerity in establishing good school 
relationships. 
The letter further cited two incidents, (i) the use of "obscene 
gestures to correct [female] students ••• in the cafeteria," 
and (ii) a telephone call advising a local radio station of a 
proposal by the School Board to "establish .an appropriate dress 
code for professional people," resulting in the proposal being 
broadcast prematurely. 
Respondent then sued the School Board, its members indi-
vidually, and the superintendent, demanding reinstatement, back 
pay and punitive damages. The complaint primarily av err / ed juris-
diction under Section 1983, but also asserted a denial of First 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights, relying upon 28 u.s . c . § 1331 
(federal question), and averring more than $10,000 in controversy. 
Decisions of the Courts Below 
The district court started its opinion by saying: 
Basically this is a civil rights case (42 u.s.c. 
§ 1983) .•• [and] this court has jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 •.. [since the amount 
in controversy] would have amounted to more than 
$10,000. 
Having disposed of jurisdiction in two sentencei , the DC 
addressed the merits at length. Respondent apparently had a good 
many "pluses" and "minuses" in his record that included a variety 
- -No. 75-1278 3. 
- of activities. He/ served as president of the Teachers' Associa-
tion for the 1969-70 term, an organization that threatened to 
strike at one point. The DC's opinion does not suggest that the 
School Board's action was related to respondent's having served 
as an officer of the Association. Rather, the DC reviewed "a 
number of specific instances [detailed in the evidence] as 
relevant to the 1971 Board decision not to renew the contract." 
These included, in briefest summary: a controversy with a fellow 
teacher (the Hinkle incident); a controversy with cafeteria per-
sonnel over the food, in which respondent publicly called employees 
"stupid;" in connection with a disciplinary complaint, respondent 
- called several students "sons of bitches:" on another occasion, 
respondent had a controversy with four girl students that produced 
"a heated verbal dispute" in which respondent "gave the girls the 
--
two fingered gesture;" and the calling of the radio station mentioned 
above. Despite these episodes, respondent received high ratings on 
his classroom performance. 
The DC's conclusions reflect the conceded uncertainty 
of the judge. Among other things, the opinion states (and re-
spondent's brief concedes) that under Ohio law a non-tenured teacher 
"may be denied re-~mployment for no reason at all." 
The opinion went on as follows: 
(Petition lla.) 
No member of the Board acted with any malice. 
That is true of the Superintendent. In fact, as 




- -No. 75-1278 4. 
the Superintendent were faced with a situation 
in which there did exist in fact reason -- (see 
James v. West Virginia, 322 F. Supp. 217 (S.D. 
W. Va. 1971), aff. 448 F.2d 785 (4th Cir. 1971)) 
independent of any First Amendment rights or 
exercise thereof, to not extend tenure. It is 
important to note that the new contract involved 
"tenure" and the record must be viewed with that 
in mind (i.e., prior recommendations and evalua-
tion lose some force a/c not made in a similar 
situation). As we see it and find as a fact, 
the Superintendent and the Board were faced with 
a situation in which there were a number of moving 
causes, some permissible and some not permissible. ~ 0 
The action based thereon, whatever its legal -?C-o 
results, cannot be described as arbitrary or ~~ ~ 
retaliatory or malicious or marked by bad faith. 
The DC then moved to its conclusions of law, holding 
that "if a non-permissible reason, e.g., exercise of Rirst Amend-
- ment rights, played a smbstantial part in the decision not to renew 
even in the face of other permissible grounds -- the decision may 
not stand." The DC found that the call to the radio station "did 
-
play a substantial part," and therefore held that respondent was 
"entitled to reinstatement with back pay" and "to tenure on the 
same basis as if he had been employed by the defendant Board." 
The DC dismissed the suit, however, against the individual 
defendants, leaving only the Board itself as a defendant. The DC 
......_ -
expressly found no malice or bad faith, and denied punitive damages. 
Finally, the DC admitted that it "may__be wrong:" 
~ ._. . -
The Board acted here in a rather untrod field 
(several causes, one impermissible). This Court, 
while concluding as it has, recognizes a great 
deal of doubt and may be wrong. In such a situation . 




- -No. 75-1278 5. 
CA6 affirmed by order, and without an opinion. 
Petitioner's Position 
Petitioner relies heavily on two issues not mentioned 
by the courts below. It argued that the DC lacked jurisdiction 
because a Board of Education is not a "person" under§ 1983, and 
therefore is not subject to money damages. Under Ohio law, a 
School Board is a subdivision of the state and not a person. 
(Brief 19.) A long list of cases is cited as supporting petitioner's 
position that a Board may not be sued under§ 1983. TWo of these 
are recent decisions from the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, which my 
clerk should read. 
Petitioner also argues that respondent never had a claim 
that could be valued at $10,000, and therefore cannot be sued under 
Section 1331. Finally, as to the right to sue the Board, petitioner 
relies on the Eleventh Amendment. 
On the merits, petitioner argues that there were abundant 
reasons for not renewing the contract quite independent of the 
~ 
telephone call to the radio station -- even if that ~ be regarded 
as exercise of a First Amendment right. 
Respondent's Position* 
My recollection (without having my file here in Richmond) 
* Respondent is represented by the Bredhoff firm, one of the best 
labor law and civil rights firms in Washington. As would be expected, 
it has filed a strong brief. As so often h ~ppens, the interest of 





No. 75-1278 6. 
is that we took this case to resolve the jurisdictional issue with 
respect to whether a School Board, an instrumentality of the state, 
may be sued under§ 1983. Respondent argues that we need not reach 
this issue. It is said that jurisdiction is asserted "on two 
grounds: a cause of action directly under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, with jurisdiction predicated upon 28 u.s.c. § 1331; and a 
cause of action under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (1983) with 
jurisdiction predicated upon 28 u.s.c. § 1343(3) and (4)." 
In City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, we held that 
municipalities are not "persons" within the meaning of§ 1983. 
This holding was based in part on Monroe v. Pape. The question 
of what governmental instrumentality -- if any -- constitutes a 
"person" is referred to as the "Monroe-Kenosha problem." Respondent , 
obviously anxious to avoid that "problem," says the district court 
was right in ruling (actually it was an assumption without any 
discussion) that it had jurisdiction under§ 1331. 
There is a more basic question that respondent also 
would like to avoid. This is whether a cause of action for damages 
"exists directly under the Fourteenth Amendment irrespective of 
the implementing civil rights legislation," a question we merely 
posed in Aldinger v. Howard decided last Term. Respondent agrees 
that we may inquire into jurisdiction sua sponte, but avers conclu-
sorily that this question is not "a jurisdictional question." 





No. 75-1278 7. 
As to the jurisdictional amount under§ 1331, I am 
inclined to think respondent is right that the fact that tenure 
ultimately was in issue insures the requisite amount. But one 
does not reach this question unless the action may be brought 
directly under the Fourteenth Amendment without relying on 
implementing civil rights statutes. 
On the merits, respondent makes the arguments that 
would be expected . He relies primarily on Perry v. Sindermann, 
408 U.S. 593, 597-98 . But respondent recognizes that Pickering 
v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568, requires a balancing 
type of analysis where the implicated First Amendment right is 
that of a school teacher who has responsibilities to the system 
and the public it serves. 
Comment 
My interest in the case is not on the merits, but on 
the fundamental questions whether a school board may be sued 
either under§ 1983 or directly by virtue of asserting First 
Amendment rights through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
I comment here, for the benefit of my present clerks, 
that I have little enthusiasm for the open-ended expansion of 
§ 1983 jurisdiction that has occurred since Monroe v. Pape, an 
expansion that no one dreamed of for nearly the first century 





No. 75-1278 8. 
been the draining of all rational content from the phrase "color 
of law," but this is not an issue in this case. 
I take it as probably settled by Monroe v. Pape and 
City of Kenosha v. Bruno that a school board is not a "person" 
within the meaning of§ 1983. In Ohio a school board is an 
instrumentality of the state. I see no principled difference, 
in this respect, between a school board and a municipality or 
a county. 
This leaves the more serious question whether there 
may be a judicially created right of action for damages directly 
against a school board to vindicate Eourteenth Amendment rights? 
I have taken a quick look at the excellent Note in 89 Har. L. Rev. 
922, and confess surprise that this question already has attracted 
so much attention from district and circuit courts of appeal, 
apparently with considerable lack of unanimity. 
I agree that Bivens may be read as supporting the ju-
dicial creation of such a remedy. But, as the authors of the Note 
also recognized, Bivens is readily distinguishable. It involved 
federal agents who could not be sued under§ 1983; nor did it in-
volve an instrumentality or entity of a state. These distinctions 
do not necessarily preclude an extension of what might arguably be 
characterized as the rationale of Bivens, but they are not insub-





No. 75-1278 9. 
and the acceptance (since the defeat of the Sherman Amendment in 
1871) of the policy against federal damage suits against state 
entities. I will not undertake in this brief memorandum to weigh 
the arguments pro and con that are set forth quite well in the 
Harvard Law Review Note, nor to explore other arguments and policy 
considerations. I will welcome enlightenment by my clerk. 
I will mention one practical consideration with which 
any litigation lawyer is familiar: a jury is more likely to bring 
in a verdict against a municipality or a state entity than against 
an individual, even though it is now assumed widely that state 
provided insurance protects such individuals.* Juries -- despite 
being taxpayers in varying degrees -- also tend to be more than 
generous in awarding damages against municipalities and state or 
municipal entities. At a time when a good many municipalities 
are in financial difficulties, the prospect of uninsurable damage 
suits by any citizen who perceives an injury -- and they are likely 
to be legion -- is not one to gladden the hearts of municipal 
financial officers or of the banks and underwriters who extend 
necessary credit. 
At a somewhat higher level of policy consideration, direct 
action for damages under the Fourteenth Amendment would simply bypass 
* I am informed by School Board members that since Wood v. Strickland 
many individuals will no longer serve on such boards unless they 






No . 75-1278 10. 
the body of law that, until now, has protected state entities 
from federal damage suits. 
Perhaps I have said enough to indicate that if this 
* .... -question is fairly before us (even though it was not addressed 
by the DC or CA6 and has not been argued adequately in the briefs), 
I consider it a question of major significance requiring careful 
thought by our chambers. 
* * * * 
As to the merits of this case, if we reach them, I am 
inclined to disagree with the courts below. One is reluctant, 
for the reasons stated in Perry v. Sindermann, to appear to en-
dorse any restraint on an arguable First Amendment right. But 
the asserted right in this case, involving a single, apparently 
minor episode, must be judged under Pickering standards. More-
over, and -- to me, more important -- the right of this teacher 
to reinstatement with tenure and to recover back pay damages should 
hardly turn rationally on the single fact that the phone call to 
the radio station was mentioned in the Superintendent's letter. 
The ..E£.,: ~ as a fact that other reasons existed that would have - - -----
justified fully the School Board's action. I believe the testimony 
before the DC (which should be read more carefully) also supports 
the view that respondent's contract would not have been renewed had 
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No. 75-1278 11. ~ 
There is something slightly ridiculous about this case. 
It is conceded that no reason need have been given for not renewing 
the contract. Nor is it seriously disputed, as noted above, that 
there were valid reasons for non-renewal. Thus, the Board could 
have terminated respondent's relationship with impunity had it 
(i} assigned no reason whatever,* or (ii) assigned only the reasons 
identified by the DC as justifying non-renewal. Simply because 
I 
the Board, without understanding these subtleties, also mentioned 
one "wrong reason," we now have a "First Amendment case." 
Much indeed often the ultimate result -- would depend 
in these cases on who has the better legal advice or who is just 
plain lucky (as respondent appears to have been). If a teacher 
or other state employee wishes not to be discharged, or to be 
sure his contract is renewed, he will be careful to make at least 
I 
one outrageous speech every year against his employer. He thereby 
could create a First Amendment issue that would virtually foreclose 
the exercise of discretion by the employer to terminate the services 
of an incompetent or e~en dishonest employee. On the other hand, 
the Board itself -- by giving no reasons or the "right reasons" --
may terminate the services of an employee when the "real reason" 
(unacknowledged or unproved) may in fact implicate First Amendment 
rights. The law should not be quite this much of an "ass." 
* And assuming there was no proof that the Board's action was in 




The School Board has argued, in addition to the merits, 
that it cannot be sued under §1983 and that jurisdiction was 
not available under §1331 because of Doyle's failure to meet 
the amount in controversy requirement. At no point has the 
School Board challenged the implicit holding of the D.C. and 
the C. A. that an action of this type can be based directly on 
the 14th Amendment with jurisdiction under §1331. I agree with 
'( resp's argument that this 14th Amendme1;5 point cannot be raised 
1 by the Court~ sponte. The reason for thi s conclusion is 
a rather arcane, but important distinction between dismissing 
a claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted and dismissing it for want of jurisdiction. See 
Resp's Brief at 17 n . 7 an d Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 682-83 
(1964) . 
As a result of the above analysis, in order to reach a 
significant issue--namely, §1983 jurisdiction over school boards 
and the like--the Court would have to conclude that the D.C . 
and the C.A . erred on the question of amoun t in controversy. 
Based on one reading of the briefs, I find the argument made 
on this point by resp to be basically in line with my previous 
understanding of the law. If resp had been rehired the next 
time, he would have been a tenured teacher under Ohio law. It 
is true that he had no right to be rehired, but if one assumes 
that the decision not to rehire him was constitutionally infirm, 
a calculation of damages incorporating his continuing losses 
from the lack of tenure seems appropriate. In any event, this 
question is hardly certworthy standing alone. The decisions 
below are so limited that there is little danger of their 
harming the law--C . A. 6 did not even mention the issue . 
Assuming that the Court were inclined to push through 
the amount in controversy point so that §1983 was a necessary 




for review by this Court. The D.C. specifically avoided 
basing jurisdiction primarily on §1983 so that it would not 
have to discuss the hard questions that the case was taken 
by this Court to discuss . The C.A. opinion avoided the question 
of jurisdiction altogether. 
I have discussed this problem with two other clerks. 
Dianne Wood feels quite strongly that the case should be 
DIG'ed, particularly in light of the good cases that present 
the §1983 issue. Although John Spiegal has some doubts about 
the amount in controversy question, he is more fundamentally 
outraged by the failure of the D.C. or the C.A. to address 
squarely the question of a cause of action based directly on 
the 14th Amendment. I agree that the courts below displayed 
sloppy judicial form, but the fact remains that that issue was 
no f aised on appeal, and I am quite convinced that this Court 
should not, inde ed cannot, raise it on its own initiative. '? 
From my very limited perspective, this seems to be a 
good case to DIG. To resolve the case would require consider-
able effort which would have little useful result, at least 
as far as the jurisdictional questions are concerned. I know, 
however, that you have some interest in the case on its merits. 
You may decide that the case should be kept for those issues . I 
have no recommendation on the merits at this stage, having 
concentrated on the jurisdictional questions for this mini-memo . 
~ ~ e• _, . fir($ 
t.d~~ t/ ~ (-&..ft~-~ 
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1) Amount in Controversy for Jurisdiction Under §1331: 
In Horton v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 367 U.S. 348 Xtil 
(1961), the Court reaffirmed what is the traditional test for 
amount in controversy: 
The ~N general federal rule has long been to decide 
what the amount in controversy is from the complaint 
itself, unless it appears or is in some way shown that 
the amount stated in the complaint is not claimed DX 
"in good faith." In deciding this question of good faith 
we have said that it "must appear to a legal certainty that 
the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount 
to justify dismissal." Id . at 353. 
Applying the Horton test to resp's complaint, it seems rather clear 
that he would survive a pre-trial motion to dismiss, and that is the 
relevant standard. 
wouJ L ~ b ec. Y\ 
Resp's salary) had he been awarded a new contract) ~ Amore than 
$10,000. Resp points to the general rule that the salary of a job 
is the normally accepted XM~NX amount in controversy in actions 
challenging the loss of the job. In this case, resp had secured a 
new job before filing this action, and he falls back to a secondary 
position. The new job, which was on a year-to-year contract, paid 
approximately $2000 less than the job ~M resp would have had if 
he had been rehired. By the end of the third year, the difference 
in pay xgxXK totall~d $5,158. Obviously, the amount in controversy 
e.,ve,;n t-uaJ{y 
would be metAif li]{X~R resp continued in the lower paying job, as he 
apparently has. At the time of the complaint, there was also the 
real~X possibility that resp would be thrown out of work altogether, 
in which case the amount in controversy would be met much more quickly. 
The only real question is whether resp should be allowed to 
cumulate his loss, and I think that he obviously should be so allowed. 
If he had been rehired, he would have had the Ohio equivalent of 
tenure in the school district. In an action for not being rehired, 
- -
- the benefits that the resp would have had if he had been rehired 
seem entirely appropriate for meetinglrn the amount in controversy 
requirement. The Court evidenced no concern with the cumulation 
of loss in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 642 n.10 (1975), 
where the amount in controversy could only be met if the loss of 
social security benefits could be cumulated for more than three 
years. That case also involved the possibility of interim changes 
-
-
in status that might have result~d in the amount in controversy falling 
below $10,000. 
RX Petrs argue that resp should not be able to cumulate benefits 
because he was not entitled to be rehired. But, they do not dispute 
M that resp would have been tenured had he been rehired, so their 
argument is very weak. 
There is another basis for finding the requisite amount in 
controversy. Resp's complaint requested $50,000 in damages. I am --- :w,r--,,....,.--.._.. ~----"W-' ,,,,--.,, 'W'--- --not sure that this was denominated as punitive damages or that this 
would make a difference. Petrs apparently view it as a claim for 
punitive damages, at least in part, because they address an argument 
to that issue. They acknowledge that punitive damages can be used 
to MliX meet the amount in controversy. Bell v. Preferred Life Assurance 
Society, 320 U.S. 238 (1943). They argue that punitive damages should 
not be counted if they are not KID claimed in good faith or if they 
are claimed merely to establish jurisdiction. They do not claim, however 
that resp did not claim the punitive damages in good faith. Needless 
to say, the fact that the D.C. did not award any punitive damages is 
not determinative. Thus, punitive damages could provide another basis 
for supporting the finding of amount in controversy. 
L 
- -
,r 'i /i.-'l;l ~ ~ 
- 2) Can an Action Be Brought As I said in my earlier memorandum ' on this question, I think 
~ that the Cou rt should wait for a case from a C.A. in which this 
viA-
case is clearly presented, so that the Court wil l-have the benefit 




will outline the issues involved here. In approaching this~X question 
~1-'r 
L_? your "aid to memory" memorandum, "Damage Ref.'\edies Against Municipalities 
have relied heavily on the student note that .MX you mention in 
? ,~' For Constitutional Violations", 89 Harv. L. Rev. 922 (1976). Because 
of time pressures, I have only been able to spot check the many cases 
cited in the note, and the following analysis is, in effect, an exercise 
in "count er-punching" against the arguments made in the note. 
~ There are policy arguments in favor of allowing recovery against 
- n-nicipalities for constitutional violations. The possibility of 
~~ 
easier proof problems and the advantage of the deeper JH~kHXX pocket , 
a.,,..-t, •~-o 'IH.,, .. ...., u .. ~..,,.,~ 
of the municipality would allow compe~s~tion of the victims A By mak ing 
C OJq \,(MO I y) A,,• ..t /41.....~ 7r.s I 
theM municipalities pay, there isAJ chance of greater de€err~~;e of 
constitutional ~XHKIKtHU violations that can be prevented. In a 
/ brief aside, tre author of the note concludes that there is no 11th 
~'I'""" Amendment ~H~Hl problem with recovery fr? m municipalities or, among 
~ others, school JliHXXl(l!rn ' boards. c~ ~ li1.c....,_ ~ 
The central question is, of course, what llli to do with Bivens. 
·~ the case can be limited to mean nothing more than protection for 
o1•J,.-i victims of federal Hl'XXfil officials, who are not protected by §1983. 
~ Also, the Cours in Bivens specifically stated that in that caseK there 
- were no problems with theMX holding, that is, no "explicit congressional dee lara tion" M~Jf~K barring the result. As will be developed below, 




An important and complex question is the power of Congress to -limit the scope of remedies available for cons t itutional violations. 
The no t e writer here refers to the cases involving judicial deference 
to Congress when Congress is enacting remedies to enforce such 
rights. He concludes that Congress could, by virtue of its balancing 
O~ of various considerations, ~l!X preclude a direct cause of action 
for l!HKKKXMX constitutional violation s 
I agree with some of the policy .MX considerat ions that the note 
writer uses in this context. He argues that the Court, in general, 
sho uld put the burden of inertia on the non-p r otection of constitutional 
right s, so that a~ remedy shou ld be provided subject to 
Congress' decision that it is inappropria te. 
XaX The question then is whethe r Congress has done anything to 
~ -{" indicate a~ rong_ prefere~ ,.:g~-gist an action against municipalities. 
\I'_- The note writer makes some good points here which a r e drawn from 
~~e legislative history of §1983. Most of these points would also 
,,...~ be appropriate ~n: criticisms of the decision in Monroe v. Pa2elfX. r 
The Sherman Amendment was an attempt to cut down the level of private 
-1 
violence by making members of the communities in which suc h ilIDiXXXX 
violence occurred liable for it. The defeat of this amendment was, 
of cour se, the primary reason for the decision in Mon roe. There were 
a number of objection s to the Sherman Amendment: constitutionality, 
fiscal harm to municipalities, but also dange r of ifiltX making 
municipalitie s liable for acts of private persons over whom they have 
no effective con trol . There is a difference between the liability 
contemplated by the Sherman Amendment and the liability that wo uld 
result from an expansion of Bivens. Bivens wou ld only allow recovery 
where HX there was state action within the 14th Amendment; whereas, 
the Sherman AmendmentX covered a broad spectrum of private violence. 
i) 
- -
- The likely interpretation of an expanded Bivens right would be to 
require an abuse of some magnitude of governmental power. 
The note writer argues trat the Court should not give any 
deference to the Congress of 1871. The present situation is obviously 
different and different factors must be weighed. The problem with 
this argumen t is that it takes no account of the deference that ll is 
due to the present day Congress, which is perfectly capable of 
weighing MX these factors. I suppose that the answer to this response 
is the balance of inertia argument, supra. 
The note writer also relies, in a rather~ murky way, on the 
fact that §1983 has only recently re-emerged into the light of day. I The point heire, I Xl!ik think, is that a number of courts have used 
§1331 an d the EMM~X Constitution without much thought about it. 
- This is the area that most concerns me. Before the Court makes an-
pronouncements about direct actions under the 14th Amendment, I would 
like to see it make a careful study of the cases in the past that 
would not be possible under a narrow view of Bivens an d tre 1'no person" 
interpretation of §1983. I simply have not had time to make such 
-
a careful study for this case. 
If an expansion of Bivens were accepted, the Court would have to 
consider a range of questions _<:.Q!lcerning immunity. These issues are 
canvassed in the note. 
The biggest problem with the note writer's argument is the 
line of cases since Monroe v. Pape. The Court has viewed the legisla-
tive history less broadly XMMX than the note writer and has 
concluded (apparently) that there was an explicit congressional 
intention to immunize municipalities.XX This approach is most 
evident in Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973), and 
Aldinger v. Howard, 44 U.S.L.W. 4988 (1976). In Moor one of the 
lfMK.KMKX 6 
- -
e reasons for Xfilf rejecting the argument that §1988 incorporated the 
state law on vicarious XX1UilX liability of counties was that such 
-
-
a result would be DX inconsistent with the Court's decision in 
Monroe. Again looking to the legislative history, the Court stressed 
the concern about the constitutionality of imposingll liability on 
municipalities and found a congressional intent to exclude all 
municipalities. A similar reasoning went into the XX Aldinger 
decision. The Court concluded that Congress had directly or 
fili by implication negated the existence of jurisdiction over 
for 
municipalities. The best hope HX/the note~ writer's position 
is XMKX the fact that the Court remanded in City of Kenosha for 
~HKKtM~XllHH consideration of the amount in controversy question. 
The implicat ion of that action.Xis that an action is possible under 
§1331. But, on balance, the directionM of the cases is against 1 
the expansion of Bivens. - - - Even now, the result suggested by the note writer could be reached, but it would require a new look at 
the legislative history of §1983. (Judge Renfrew in Dahl v. City of 
Palo Alto, 372 F.Supp. 647 (N.D. Cal. 1974), allowed an action based 
on the 14th Amendment and §1331. He relied on part of the legislative 
history showing that there was some concern about actions being brought 
where there was only a small amount in controversy. This approach 
does, however, fly in the face of the legislative history showing 
concern about constitutionality and fiscal danger to the municipalities.) 
l.J 
• • ~ ~'?, 
\~ 
• 3) Is the Board a Person Under §1983: ~ / JII" ~ 
Given what I perceive as a strong case for jurisdiction under 
§lJJl, I think that it is unlikely that the Court will reach~ f sf l$ 
issue here. (As you know, there are several good cases waiting in 
the~ wings to raise this question.) From the rather hurried research 
that I have been able to do on this question, I think that the two 
approaches that might be adopted are represented in Muzquiz v. City 
of San Antonio, 520 F.2d 993, 1004-05 (C.A.5 1975), rev'd, 528 F.2d 
D~ 499 (1976)(en bane). The issue in Muzquiz was whether a Firemen's 
and Policemen's Pens i on Fund could be sued under §1983. Judge Tuttle, 
writing for the panel MXjalftJ majority, concluded that it could. He 
held that the question was whether the fund has "such duties, powers, 
and purposes as would make it of 'the nature of a municipality'." 
- 520 F.2d at 997. In making that determination, he asked whether it 
was "responsible for any broad governmental function" and indicated 
that factors which are relevant are" geographical area and boundaries, 
public elections, public officials, taxing power and a general public 
purpose or benefit." Id. at 998. Unmer this test, I would have to 
.J --- .. ..__.~ ----
say that the School Board in the instant case probably qualifies. 
~---~ ~,_.. ~ zw_;z :..w:a ,,_., --- ~ 7 
In the en bane reversal, C.A.5 decided that Judge Tuttle's %MXMMX.X --- -
%MXMM formulation was too narrow and adopted the dissenting position 
of Judge Godbold. He held that, "Entities that do not possess broad -
governmental powers and functions can, and frequently do, fall within 
the Monroe-Kenosha exemption." Id. at 1005. Judge Godbold argued that: 
-~ • \<IA"' 
The inquiry in such a case becomes whether the public body is 
so connected--administratively, functionally, lllf fiscally, 
and in other ways--to a state, city or county that it is not 
suable under §1983, not because of its characteristics as an 
independent entity but because it is in effect an arm or 






There is really not much of an argument for holding that 
school boards, mXM with the duties and powers that they typically 
have, do not fall within the rationale of Monroe v. Pape. Pen sion 
funds may be somewhat harder, but that is another issue. Resp does 
not even argue the XiRl §1983-person issue. 
<l 
~H..A..~~1•~~ 
- ~ -~~ ~ r--·" ,i;C.J 
...e -""• """-',/.....,.,_ 
- 4) Does the 11th Amendment Protect Petr from this Action: 
-
-
My reading of the cases here indicates that the 11th Amendment 
applies if the entity in question is an arm or alter ego of the state, 
and that it does not apply if the ~HKt.K~ entity is a relatively 
autonomous entity, like a county. Thus, Hart and Wechsler state that 
"a suit against a county, a municipality, or other lesser governmentll 
unit is not regarded as a 
the Eleventh Amendment." 
Resp notes correctly 
suit against a state within the meaning of 
2nd Ed. at 690. j 
1
1,1-(. ~ ~v1J_.. ~ 
that the autonomy ~c~ .t:rds 
was a factor which was recognized and relied on in Milliken v. Bradley, 
418 U.S. 717 (1974). Resp also cites a long string of cases in 
/ ------ - -which courts have concluded that school boards are not immunized by 
the 11th Amendment. The primary thrust of resp's argument is, however, ___________, 
directed to the situation of the school board in Ohio. 
/ 
In HM Ohio there are state-wide governing statutes, and there 
is a state board of education, but the management and supervision 
of the local schools is apparently left largely to the local school 
boards. The members of the school board are popularly elected. The 
board is ~~vU{fil!HIXXM given the powers of "contracting and being 
contracted with, acquiring, holding, possessing, and XX disposing 
of real and personal property, and taking and holding in trust for 
the use and benefit of such district, any grant or devise of land and 
any donation or bequest of money or other personal property." Resp 
Br. at 53. The boards have considerable financial powers. Although 
~ 
each board receives KK~ state money under a per capita KX formula, 
each board ~KX also haw the power to lev/y and collect taxes, HffllMHX 
unilaterally up to certain limits and) by concurrence of the local 




Resp answers the petrs' argument that the state would have to 
pay any judgment. Resp argues that state law would allow the issuance 
of bonds to pay the judgment and also that the general levy ing authority 
of the board is sufficiently broad to allow for the payment of such 
a judgment as was entered here. Even if there were no way that 
a judgment could be satisfied under ex isting poNers, the conclusion 
does not follow that the state treasury wou ld be required to pay~ ? 
Petr bases a XI large part of K~X«IDC their arguments on t he 
immunity under state law of school boards from tort ac tions. The 
Ohio courts have held that school boards can be sued in matters 
relating to their specific power to contract. Resp argues that the 
Ohio courts might decide that this case, which does "relate" to those 
powers of contrac ting, could be brought under that heading. More 
- fundamentally, resp argues that the issue here is federal immunity, 
an d that the particular immunity doctrines established by state law 
do not govern. One looks to the state law to determine the kind of 
entity one is dealing with, and, beyond that, one applies federal 
stan dards. This seems correct to me, and a school board like this one 
t 
-
seems like the other "lesser governmental units" to 
Xm~Hfillffi Amendment has been held to be inapplicable. 
which the 11th 
9~~ 






5) The Standar d for the 1st EMK Amendment Analysis: 
There is not a great deal that I can add to your decision here. 
I think that the previous cases leave a fair amount of room for 
XM maneuver. Pickering was a case in which the teache r was dismissed 
fo r the sole reas on of writing the letter to the newspaper. I think 
that one can quite legitimately take the balancing conEiderations from 
Pickering an d apply them t o thisM kind of case, but thE! MX situations 
can be distinguished . Perry involves a similar setting, but ~t does 
not help a t all with the problem of an impermissible rE!ason mixed in 
with obviously permissible reasons, because that case was XHl!XKHHXX 
sent back to the lower court for the development of thE!Se facts. 
Were the decision mine, I think that I wou ld go wi.th the 
I 
"substantill part" standard used by the D.C. I think that that standard 
- 1 is sufficiently high to avoid problems of "faked" XX lE t Amen dment 
exercise. Your concern about the poor dupes who say t he wron g thing 
an d the smart folks who know better than t o say why the!y did what they 
did is ce r tainly understandable, but that problem is present in a 
This result wou ld vindicate the 1st Amendment ~ •. J;t' number of situations. 
~- val ues witmou t giving incompetent teacher s a free ride. Although the 
.,f · resp certainly had s~me XaX flaws, the record indicates that he was a 
- 7 ... 
-good and energetic teacher wi th a numbe r of positive attributes. The 
lette r from the Superintendent listed only two ~~MMK reas ons, one of 
them impermissible, an d the letter was wr itten after consultation 
with the Board, making it a fairly accura t e indicator lil of the real 
reason. The D.C., after hearin g all of the evidence, found trat the 
XM~~ impermissible reason was a substantial part of the decision . I 
wou ld say that his decision sho~ld stand. If C.A.6 intended to state 
a separate standar d in its casual order, that standard would lend itself 
too much to the abuses that concern you . XXXIMM Finally, XfiM I find 
the balancing of the various inte r ests .. identified in Pickering to favor 
- -
- resp more than the balancing favored the teacher in Pickering. 
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with the L ,C ~ 
.e renewal of <:t_ 
rence?~ 





with Potter to set the c a se down for reargument on the issue 
• 
of whe t her 1331 jurisdiction obtaine d in this case, notwith-
standing the fact that the jurisdictional amount was present, 
but the alternative view which I tentatively e x pre ssed and 
now set forth in more detail, is as follows: 
- e J c-: .,___,. -1 n ' ~nµmttt (ljourl qf f4t ',!lttit,b ~!alts ~~~ 
j~Mfpttghnt. g). {!J. 20,5-"}~ ~ ~ .,__,_-.c.,,i._ . ..,.---..,c....~ 
CHAMBER S Or 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST ~-:f/J 





No. 75-1278 - Mount Healthy City School Distrird::... • V 
Board of Education v. Dovle 
Because I took two different positions during Confe: ~ -
0 #-If 
discussion of this case I submit the following with the L _ ~ 
. . j:_j.? 
thought that it might be at least useful for the renewal of <:i_ 
our consideration of the case at Friday's Conference?~ 
quite confused at the end of our long discussion last Fr~ ~ 
and I may not have been the only one. I do not feel 
apologetic about my confusion, because I think the case 
virtually "bristles" with difficulties, which become more 
apparent on extended examination. I had originally voted 
with Potter to set the case down for reargument on the issue 
• 
of whether 1331 jurisdiction obtaine d in this case, notwith-
standing the fact that the jurisdictional amount was pres ent, 
but the alternative view which I tentatively expressed and 
now set forth in more detail, is as follows: 
- -
- 2 -
(1) On the first question raised by the 
petition for certiorari, which is simply 
a challenge to the jurisdictional finding 
of $10,000 in controversy, I would find in 
favor of respondent, believing that he has 
satisfied all of the normal tests for show-
ing jurisdictional amount. 
(2) On the second question presented, I 
would hold that the Mount Healthy School 
District Board of Education is much closer 
to a county or municipal corporation than 
it is to the State of Ohio, and therefore 
under Thurgood's opinion in Moor v. Alameda 
County, 411 U.S. 693, it cannot claim the 
~ -
benefit of the Eleventh Amendment. 
--- ,-,, --us 
~ 
~ 
(3) I would hold with respect to the 
question raised in the supplemental authorities 
and reply brief filed by petitioner that it 
was not properly preserved. This is the 
really difficult issue in the case: whether, 
in view of the fact that Congress has enacted 
- -
- 3 -
a substantive cause of action in 42 u.s.c. 
§ 1983, and that substantive cause of action 
has been held by us to exclude a municipal 
corporation from liability, a cause of action 
may nonetheless be inferred directly from the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution which 
does not contain such exclusion, and which 
will support jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. 
§ 1331. I would point out that this is not, 
strictly speaking, a jurisdictional question 
(which may be raised at any time, or even by 
the Court on its own motion), relying on 
Byron's distinction between a claim under 
§ 1343, where absence of a§ 1983 cause of 
action may be jurisdictional, City of Kenosha 
v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, and a§ 1331 action 
where only a colorable claim is necessary for 
jurisdiction. Montana-Dakota Utilities v. 
Public Service Co. 341 U.S. 246; Bell v. Hood, 
- -
- 4 -
327 U.S. 678. I would make it clear that we 
are not deciding the§ 1983 issue here. 
(4) I would then go on to rule on the merits, 
and if there were a majority to follow the views 
advanced by the Chief, calling it "harmless 
error", or by Potter and me, saying that we 
would r~quire a "but for" causation in order 
to sustain a First Amendment claim, I would 
vacate and remand on the merits. But if a 
majority is of the other view, I would still 
adhere to the analysis of the non-merits 
questions, in order to decide the case. We 
have already voted to dismiss as improvidently 
granted in Cook v. Hudson; we have affirmed 
Parker Seal by an equally divided Court; we 
have remanded ~cott v. Kentucky Parole Board 
for consideration of mootness. I agreed with 
each of those dispositions, but with those 
- -
- 5 -
dispositions having take n place, I think we 
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JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN November 10, 1976 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Re: No. 75-1278 - Mount Healthy City School District Board 
v. Dovle 
I am generally in accord with Bill Rehnquist, that is: 
1. I, too, believe that the plaintiff- respondent has satisfied i{_,tAJ 
the normal test for showing jurisdictional amount. / 
z. I conclude that the Board cannot claim the benefit of the 
Eleventh Amendment. For what it is wo:.th, Ohio law seems fairly 
clear that school boards do not equate with the State. They are given 
r _ights to sue and be sued. One could even espouse a theory of waiver. 
- - z::-::c 
3. I would be willing not to decide the§ 1983 issue in this 
case. We certainly have little help from counsel, and I doubt if much 
more would be forthcoming even if reargument were ordered. I am 
content to rule that the issue was not properly reserved. 
4. I agree that it would not be wise to dismiss as having been 
improvidently granted. I could participate in an approach on "but for" 
causation. This, in fact, might clear the atmosphere for situations 
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On Writ of Certiorari tq ( 
Circuit, t: Fred Doyle. J /J/ dJ._ 
[December - , 1976] "'(t j 
v. " 
MR. :fu§TICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinign of th~ 
Court.  
Re~pon(:lent Doyle sued petitioner Mt. Healthy Board of ~~ 1 . 
Educa~ion in the United States District Court for the South- ~-~ f ~ --. -v-
ern District of Ohio. Doyle claimed that the Board's refusal ,J. (•  
to renew his contract in 1971 violated his rights under the ,e, II 4 , 
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States ,.~ _ +-
Constitution. After a bench trial the District Court held ~ 
that Doyle was entitled to reinstatement with back pay, - ~  
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the -
judgment, and we granted the Board's petition for certiorari / /-;::-: ~ 
to consider an admixture of jurisdictional and constitutional ....-, 
claims. 
I 
Although the respondent's complaint asserted jurisdiction 
under both 28 U. S. C. § 1343 and 28 U. S. C. § 1331, thE} 
District Court rested its jurisdiction only on § 1331. Peti-
iioner's first jurisdictional contention, which we have little 
difficulty disposing of, ilSserts that the $10.000 amount in 
controversy require<:i,. cy tJi~t se~tiqn i§ not ~at,i§fied in thi§ 
.~~ 
~ ~ v&dli«i".,._( 
., Jl'I ~ - ..... t. ~ .,, . J - ,. ,  .. ( .. <.. liiC1 "'I• c..&1t:: 
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The le~ding case on this point is St. Paul Indemnity Co. 
v. Red Cab Co., 303 U. S. 283 (1938), which stated this test: 
" ... The .sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the 
claim is apparently made in good faith. It must appear 
to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than 
the jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal. The ins 
~bility of plantiff to recover an amount adequate to give 
the Court jurisdiction does not show his bad faith or 
oust the jurisqiction." Id., at 288-289. 
We have cited ,this rule with approval as recently as 
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636, 642 n. 10 (1975), 
and think it requires disposition of the jurisdictional ques-
tion tendered by the petition in favor of the respondent. 
At the time Doyle brought this action· for reinstatement and 
$50,000 damages, he had already accepted a job in a different 
school system paying approximately $2,000 per year less 
than he would . have earned with Mt. Healthy Board had 
he been rehired. The :pistrict Court in fact awa.rded Doyle 
compensatory damages in the amount of $5,158 by reason 
of income already lost at the time it ordered his reinstate-
ment. Even if the Di5itrict Court had chosen to award 
only compensatory damages and not reinstatement, it is far 
only compensatory damages and not reinstatement, it was far 
from a ''legal certainty" at the time of suit that Doyle 
would not have been entitled to more than $10,000. 
II 
The Board has filed a document entitled "Supplemental 
Authorities" in which it raises quite a different "jurisdic-
tional" issue than that presented in its petition for certiorari 
and disposed of in the preceding section of this opinion. 
Relying on the District Court opinion in W ea.thers v. West 
Yuma County School District, 387 F. Supp. 552, 556 (1974),. 
the Boarq contends that even though Doyle may have met 
the jurisdictional amount requirement of § 1331, it may not 
be subjected to liability in this case because Doyle's only 
- -
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substantive constitutional claim arises under 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1983. Because it is not a "person" for purposes of § 1983, 
the Boarq reasons, liability may no more be imposed on it 
where federal jurisdiction is grounded on 28 U. S. C. § 1331 
th1:1,n where such jurisdiction is grounded on 28 U. S. C. § 1343. 
The District Court avoided this issue by reciting that it 
had not "stated any conclusion on the possible Monroe-
Kenosha probl~m in this case since it seems that the case 
is properly here as a § 1331 as well as a § 1983 one." App. 
to Pet., at 15a. This reference to our decisions in Monroe v. 
Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961), and City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 
412 U. S. 507 (1973), where it was held that a municipal 
corporation is not a suable "person" under § 1983, raises 
the question whether petitioner Board in this case is suffi-
ciently like the municipal corporations in those cases so 
that it, too, is excluded from § 1983 liability. 
The quoted statement of the District Court makes clear 
its view that if the jurisdictional basis for the action is 
§ 1331, the 1imit1:1,tions contained in 42 U. S. C. § 1983 do not 
apply. The Board argues, on the contrary, that siqce Con-
gress in § 1983 has expressly created · a remedy relating to 
violations of cQnstitutional rights unqer color of state law, 
one who seeks to recover for such violations is bound by the 
limitations contained in § 1983 whatever jurisdictional sec-
tion he invokes. 
The question of whether the Board's arguments should 
prevail, or whether as respondent urged in oral argument, 
we should, by analogy to our decision in B?'.vens v. Six Un-
known Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narwtics, 
403 U. S. 388 (1971), imply a cause of action directly 
from the Fourteenth Amendment which would not be sub-
ject to the limitations contained in § 1983, is one which 
has never been decided by this Court. Counsel for respond-
ent at oral argument suggested that it is an extremely 
important question and one which should not be decided 
ion this record. We awee with respondent, 
- -
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The Board has raised this question for the first time in 
a document filed after its reply brief ih this Court. Were it 
in truth a contention that the District Court lacked jur-
isdiction, we would be obliged to consider it, even as we 
are obliged to inquire sua sponte whenever a doubt arises 
as to th~ existence of federal jurisdiction. Liberty Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U. S. 737, 740 (1976); Louis-
ville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley, 211 U. S. 149, 
152 (1908). And if this were a § 1983 action, brought under 
the special jurisdictional provision of ·28 U. S. C. § 1343 
which requires no amount in controversy, it would be appro-
priate for this Court to inquire, · for jtJrisdictional purposes, 
whether a statutory action had in fact been alleged. City of 
Kenosha v. B~no, supra. lfowever, where an action is brought 
under § 1331, the' catch-all feder~l questio.µ provision requir-
ing $10,000 in controversy, jurisdiction is sufficiently estab-
lished by allegation of a claim u,nµer the Constitution ·or 
federal statutes, unless jt "clearly appears to be immaterial 
and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdic-
tion .... " Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 682 (1946); 
Montaria-Dakota Utilities v. Public Service Co., 341 U. S. 
246, 249 (1951). 
Here respondent alleged that the Board had violated his 
rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and 
cla-ill\ed the jurisdictionally necessary amount of damages. 
The claim 'that the Board is a "person" under § 1983, even 
assuming the correctness of the Board's argument that the 
§ 1331 action is limited by the restrictions of § 1983, is 
not so patently without merit as to fail the test of Bell 
-v. H-9od, supra. Therefore, the question 1:\8 to whether the 
respondent stated a claim for relief under § 1331 is not of 
the jurisdictional sort which the Court raises on its own 
motion. Because it has not been preserved on appeal, the 
related questions of whether a school district is a person 
·for purposes of § 1983 is likewise npt before us. 'We _lea,~ 
- -
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those questions for another day, and assume, without decid~ 
ing, that th~ respondent could sue under § 1331 without 
regard to the limitations imposed by 42 U. S. C. § 1983. 
III 
The District Court found it unnecessa.ry to decide whether 
the Board was entitled to immunity from suit in the federal 
courts under the Eleventh Amendment, because it decided 
that any sµch immunity had been waived by Ohio statute 
and decisional hiw. In vil:lw of the treatment of waiver 
by a St&te of its Eleventh Amendment immunity from 
suit in Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 
459, 464-466, we are less sure than was the District Court 
that Ohio had eonsented to suit against entities such as 
the Board in the federal courts. We prefer to address instead 
the question of whether such an entity had any Eleventh 
Amendment immunity in the first p1ace, since if we conclude 
that it had none it will be unnecessary to reach the ques ... 
tion of waiver. 
The bar of the ·Eleventh Amendment to suit in federal 
courts extends to states and state officials in appropriate 
circumstances, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974); 
Ford Motor Co. v. f)epartment of Treasury, supra., but does 
not extend to coµnties and similar municipal corporations. 
See County of Lincoln v. Luning, 133 U. ·s. 529, 530 (1890) ; 
Moor v. County of Alameda, 4:11 U. S. 693, 717- 72l (1973). 
The issue here thus turns on whether the Mt. Healthy 
Board of Education is to be treated as an arm of the State 
partaking of the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity, or 
is instead to be treated as a municipal corporation or other 
political subdivision to which the Eleventh Amendment does 
not extend. The answer depends at least in part upon 
the nature of the entity created by state law. Under Ohio 
·taw th~ "state" does not include ' 'political subdivisions," and 
''political subdivisions" do include local school district$, 
- -
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Ohio Rev. Code § 2743.01. Petitioner is but one of many 
local school boards within the State of Ohio. It is subject 
to some guidance from the State :f3oard of Education, Ohio 
Rev. Code § 3301.07, and receives a significant amount of 
money from the State. Ohio Rev. Code § 3317. But local 
school boards have extensive powers to issue bonds, Ohio 
Rev. Code § 133.27, and to levy ta.xes within certain re-
strictions of state law. Ohio Rev. Code §§ 5705.02, 5705.03, 
5705.192, 5705.194. On balance, the record before us indi-
cates that a local school board such as petitioner is more like 
a county or city than it is like an arm of the State. We 
therefore hold that it was not entitled to assert any Eleventh 
Amendment immunity from suit in the federal courts. 
IV 
Having concluded that respondent's complaint sufficiently 
pleaded jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331, that the Board 
has failed to preserve the issue whether that complaint stated 
a claim upon which relief could be granted against the 
Board, and that the Board is not immune from suit under 
the Eleventh Amendment, we now proceed to consider the 
merits of respondent's claim under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
Doyle was first employed by the Board in 1966. He, 
worked under one-year contracts for the first three years, 
and under a two-year contract from 1969 to 1971. In 1969' 
he was elected president of the Teachers' Association, in 
which position he worked to expand the subjects of direct 
negotiation between the Association and the Board of Edu-
cation. During Doyle's one-year term as president of the 
Association, and during the succeeding year when he served 
on its executive committee, there was apparently some ten-
sion in relations between the Board and the Association. 
Beginning early in 1970, Doyle was involved in several 
in.cidents not directly conn~cted with his role in the Teach .. 
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ers' Association . In one inst11,nce, he enga.ged in an argument 
with another teacher which culminated in the other teacher's 
slapping him. Doyle subsequently refused to accept an 
apology and insisted upon some punishment for the other 
teacher. His persistence in the matter resulted in the sus-
pension of both teachers for one qay, which was followed 
by a walkout by a number of other teachers, which in turn 
resulted in the lifting of the suspensions. 
On other occasions, Doyle got into an argument with 
employees of the ·school cafeteria over the amount of spaghetti 
which had been served him; referred to students, in con-· 
nection with a disciplinary complaint, as "sons of bitches"; 
and made an obscene gesture to two girls in connection with 
their failure to obey commands made in his capacity as 
cafeteria supervisor. Chronologically the last in the series 
of incidents which respondent was involved in during his 
employment by the Board was a telephone call by him 
to a local radio station. It was the Board's consideration 
of this incident which the court below found to be a violation 
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
In February of 1971, the principal circulated to various 
teachers a memorandum relating to teacher dress and appear-
ance, which was apparently prompted by the view of some 
in the administration that tbere was a relationship between 
teacher appearance and public support for bond issues. 
Doyle's response to the receipt of the memorandum-on a 
subject which he apparently understood was to be settled 
by joint teacher-administration action-was to convey the 
substance of the memorandum to a disc jockey at WSAI, 
a Cincinnati radio station, who promptly announced the 
adoption of the dress code as a news item. Doyle subse-
quently apologized to the principal, conceding that he should 
have made some prior communication of his criticism to 
tlie school administration. 
.Approximately one month later the superintendent made 
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his customary annual recommendations to the Board as to 
the rehiring of nontenured teachers. He recommended that 
Doyle not be rehired. The same recommendation was made 
with respect to nine other teachers in the district, and in 
all instances, including Doyle's, the recommendation was 
adopted by the Board. Shortly after being notified of 
this decision, respondent requested a statement of reasons 
for the Board's actions. He received a statement citing 
"a notable lack of tact in handling professional matters 
which leaves much doubt as to your sincerity in establishing 
good school relationships.'' That general statement was fol-
lowed by references to the radio station incident and to the 
obscene gesture incident.* 
The District Court found that all of these incidents had 
in fact occurred. It concluded that respondent Doyle's tele-
phone call to the radio station was "clearly protected by the 
First Amendment," and that because it had played a "sub-
stantial part" in the decisi'on of the Board not to renew 
Doyle's employment, he was entitled to reinstatement with 
backpay. App. to pet., at 12a-13ll,. The District Court did 
not expressly state what test it was applying in determining 
that the incident in question involved conduct protected 
by the First Amendment, but simply held that the commu-
*"I. You have shown a notable Jack of tact in handling professional 
matters which leaves much doubt as to your sincerity in establishing good 
school relationships. 
"A. You assumed the responsibility to notify W. S. A. I. Radio Station 
in regards to the suggestion of the Board of Education that teachers 
establish an appropriate dress code for professional people. This raised 
much concern not only within this community, but also in neighboring 
communities. 
"B. You used obscene gestures to correct students in a situation in th~ 
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nication to the radio station was such conduct. The Court 
of Appeals affirmed in a brief per curiam opinion. 
Doyle's claims under the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments are not defeated by the fact that he did not have 
tenure. Even though he could have been discharged for 
no reason whatever, and had no constitutional right to a 
hearing prior to the decision not to rehire him, Board of 
Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 (1972) , he may nonetheless 
establish a claim to reinstatement if the decision not to 
rehire him was made by reason of his exercise of constitu-
tionally protected First Amendment freedoms. Perry v. 
Sinderman, 408 U. S. 593 (1972). 
That question of whether speech of a government em-
ployee is constitutionally protected expression necessarily 
entails striking "a balance between the interests of 
the teacher. as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of 
public concern and the interest of the State as an employer, 
in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs 
through its employees." Pickering v. Board of Education, 
391 U. S. 563, 568 (1968). 'There is no suggestion by the 
Board that Doyle violated any established policy, or that its 
reaction to bis communication to the radio station was any-
'thing more than an ad hoc response to Doyle's action in mak-
ing the memorandum public. We therefore accept the Dis-
trict Court's finding that the communication was protected 
·by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. ·we are not, how-
ever, entirely in agreement with that court's manner of 
reasoning from this finding to the conclusion that Doyle is 
entitled to reinstatement with backpay. 
The District Court made the following "conclusions" on 
'this aspect of the case : 
"(1) If a non-permissible reason , e. g., exercise of 
First Amendment rights, played a substantial part in the 
tdecision not to ren.ew-.even in .the face .of other _per-
- -
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missible grounds-the decision may not stand (citations 
omitted). 
"(2) A. non-permissible reason did play a substantial 
part. That is clear. from the letter of the Superintendent 
immediately following the Board's decision, which stated 
two reasons-the one, the conversation with the radio 
station cle~rly protected by the First Amendment. A 
court may not engage . in any limitation of First Amend-
ment rights based on 'tact'-that is not to say that 'tact-
fulness' is ,irrelevant to other issues in this case." App. 
to pet., at 12a-13a. 
At the same time, though, it stated that 
"in fact, ~ this Court sees it and finds, both the Boa.rd 
and the Superintendent were faced with a situation 
in which there did exist in fact reason . . . independent 
of any First Amendment rights or exercise thereof, to 
not extend tenure." App. to pet., at 12a. 
Since respondent Doyle had no tenure, and there was 
therefore not even a state law requirement of "cause'' or 
"reason" before a decision could be made not to renew his 
employment, it is not clear what the District Court meant 
by this latter statement. Clearly the Board legally could 
have dismissed respondent had the radio station incident 
never come to its attention. One plausible meaning of the 
court's statement is that the Board and the Superintendent 
not only could, but in fact would have reached that decision 
had not the constitutionally protected incident of the tele-
phone call to the radio station occurred. "\Ve are thus brought 
to the issue whether, if that were the case, even though 
the protected conduct played a "substantial part" in the 
actual decision not to renew, Doyle is nonetheless entitled 
to automatic reinstatement. We do not think so. 
A rule of causation which focuses solely on whether pro-
. iected conduct played a part, "substantial' ' or otherwise, in 
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a decision not to rehire, could place an employee in a bet-
ter position as a result of the exercise of constitutionally 
protected conduct than he would have occupied had he 
done nothing. The difficulty with the rule enunciated by 
the District Court is that it would require reinstatement in 
cases where a dramatic and perhaps abrasive incident is in-
evitably on the minds of those responsible for the decision 
to rehire, and does indeed play a part in that decision-
even il the same decision would have heen reached had the 
incident not occurred. The constitutional principle at stake 
is sufficiently ~ cated if such an employee is placed in no 
worse a position than if he had not engaged in the conduct. 
A borderline or marginal candidate should not have the 
employment question resolved against him because of con-
stitutionally protected conduct. But that same candidate 
ought not to be able, by engaging in such conduct, to pre-
vent his employer from assessing his performance record 
and reaching a decision not to rehire on the basis of that 
record , simply because the protected conduct makes the 
employer more certain of the correctness of its decision. 
This is especially true where, as the District Court observed 
was the case here, the current decision to rehire will accord 
"tenure." The long term consequences of an award 
of tenure are of great moment both to the employee and 
to the employer. They are too significant for us to hold 
that the Board in this case would be precluded, because 
it considered constitutionally protected conduct in deciding 
not to rehire Doyle, from attempting to prove to a trier of 
fact that quite apart from such conduct Doyle's record was 
such that he would not have been rehired in any event. 
In other areas of constitutional law, this Court has found 
it necessary to formulate a test of causation which distin-
guishes between a result proximately caused by a constitu-
·tional violation and one not so caused. We think those 
,'. :~ )· 'i' - -
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cases are instrtictive in formulating the test to be applied 
here. 
In Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596 (1944), the Court 
held that even though the first confession given by a defend-
ant had been involuntary, the Fourteenth Amendment did 
not prevent the State from using a second confession ob-
taiqed 12 hours later if the coercion sµrrounding the first 
confessibn h~ been sufficiently dissipated as to make the 
seco11d confession volunt11,ry. In Wong Sun v. United States, 
371 U. S. 471, 491 (1963) , the Court was willing to assume 
that a defet1cfant's arrest had been unlawful, but to hold 
that "the connection between the arrest and the statement 
given ~verai days later had 'become so attenuated as to 
dissipate the taint.' '/:vardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 
338, 341." Parker v; North Carolina, 397 U. S. 790, 796 
( 1 Q70), held that even though a confession be assumed 
to hp,ve been involuntary in the constitutional sense of the 
word, a guilty plea entered over a month later met the test 
for the voluntfl,riness of such a plea. The Court in Parker 
relied on tp.e· same quoted language from Nardone, supra, 
as did the Court in Wong Sun, supra. We think that the 
proper test to apply in the present context is one which 
likewise protects against the invasion of constitutional rights 
without commanding undesirable consequences not necessary 
to the assurance of those rights. 
Initially, in this case, the burden was properly placed 
upon respondent to show that his conduct was constitu-
tionally protected, a.nd that this conduct was a "substantial 
factor"-or, to put it in other words, that it played a sig-
nificant role-in motivating the Board's decision not to re-
hire him. It should then, however, have been open to the 
Board to prove to the satisfaction of the trier of fact that 
even in tpe a,bsence of the protected conduct, it would have 
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We cannot tell from the District Court opinion and con-
clusions, nor from the opinion of the Court of Appeals 
affirming the judgment of the District Court, what con-
clusion those courts would have reached had they applied 
this test. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is there-
fore vaca.ted, a.nd the case rema.nded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
- -~u:vrtnu <!Jcttrl cf tfyt i,FUtittb .§tdts 
~~qtng~ gl. (!J. 2llffeJ!.' 
C HAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
December 13, 1976 
Re: No. 75-1278, Mt. Healthy City School District 
Board of Education v. Doyle 
Dear Thurgood: 
Thank you for your letter of December 13, com-
menting about the penultimate paragraph of the draft 
opinion in this case . I do not disagree at all with 
the substance of the test which you state in the 
✓ 
first paragraph of your letter, and I also realize 
that the draft opinion may not be a model of clarity 
on this point. One of the reasons for any possible 
confusion is that the District Court used the word 
"substantial factor" in its opinion, and we must 
necessarily at least recognize this as a historical 
faqt. Lewis' Arlington Heights opinion has something 
of the same problem in it, and I understand he is 
making some revisions in its language. Whe n I see 
what he recirculates , I will try to sharpen up the 
paragraph to which you refer in order to accomodate 
your view and make it consistent with the corresponding 
part of his draft. 
/ Sincerelyi/ 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
-fe;u:µuutt QJ:cu.d cf tlft 1llttittb ,:%taus-
'nlas-lrm9tmr., 10. QJ:. 2ogr,1,~ 
CHAMBERS OF' 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL December 13, 1976 
Re: No. 75-1278, Mt. Healthy City School District Board 
of Education v. Doz le 
Dear Bill: 
T am somewhat troubled by aspects of the penultimate 
paragraph of your opinion. I agree, of course, that to prevail 
plaintiff must prove that his action in phoning the radio station 
was constitutionally protected. I also agree that plaintiff must 
prove more than that the school board was aware of this action, 
or that they discussed it in making the decision not to renew the 
contract. Rather, in my view, plaintiff must prove that his 
constitutionally protected activity actually played a role in 
(i.e., was one of the reasons for) the decision not to renew his 
contract. But once plaintiff meets this burden, he has established 
that the board acted impermissibly, and to defeat the remedy of 
reinstatement I believe the school board then should be required 
to prove that it would not have renewed the contract in any event. 
This may well be what you mean to convey in the paragraph 
that concerns me. But the terms II substantial factor'' and 
"significant role" are at least ambiguous, and it would be much 
easier for me to join if you were able to clarify the relevant 
paragraph along the lines I've suggested. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
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C H A M BERS OF" 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN Dec e mber 13, 1976 
Re: No. 75-1278 - Mount H e althy City School District 
Board v . Doyle 
D ear Bill: 
Ple ase join me . 
Sinc e rely, 
1~ 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Confe rence 

CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE POTTER STEWA~T 
- -~ttp-rtnt:t QJcuri of tftt ~ lt ~fattg 
~ rur Jringhm. ~ . QJ. 2!1ffe'!-, 
December 15, 1976 
75-1278, Mt. Healthy v. Doyle 
Dear Bill, 
I am glad to join your opinion for the 
Court in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 






C H AM B E R S o r 
J USTICE JOHN PAU L STE VENS 
-
,:§n:prtnu QJ.o-url .o-f tlt't ~h ,:§fatt_g 
~zur.ltfu:ghm. ~- QJ. 2.0ffe~, 
December 22, 1976 
Re: 75-1278 - Mt. Healthy c t ty Bo~rd of 
Ed. v. Doyl~ 
Dear Bill: 
If you are willing to revise the sentence at 
the bottom of page 12 and the final paragraph of 
the opinion to make it clear that the District 
Court is merely directed to clarify its finding, 
rather than to hold a new trial, I will join your 
opinion. 
/ 
I would also like to suggest that considera-
tion be given to adding a footnote indicating that 
equitable relief would not necessarily and in-
evitably require restatement with . tenure. I 
should think , for example, that a chancellor 
could fashion a decree that would postpone the 
tenure decision for a year or so and give the 
teacher employment for that period. Perhaps such 
a footnote would be too advisory in character to 
be included i n this opinion, but at least I thought 
I would mention the point for possible future con-
sideration. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
Respectfully, 
Jd 
- -~ttnt arourt of tltt ~h j;tatts 
11Jas1tingtou. ~. <lf. 2llffe'l~ 
CHAMl!lERS 01'" 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
December 27, 191/ 
Re: No. 7 5-1278, Mt. Healthy City School District Board 
of Education v. P.£Yle 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 






.§u:pTtntt <!Jourt of tqt ~nittb ~f:attt.l 
~1urqington. l0. <q. 2!Jgi)l.' 
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RE: No. 75-1278 Mt. Healthy City School District Board 
of Education v. Doyle 
Dear Bi 11: 
I am finally at rest and am happy to join your 
opinion. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
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Re: No. 75-1278 . - Mt Healthy City School District 
v. Dovle 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
~~-
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to Conference 
't' -
9 ro: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Brennan~ 
Mr. Justice.,,,t ~ 1:,t.y 
Mr. Justice~C-
-<? .L-\-110[) Mr. Justice Marshall Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Mr. Justice Stevena 
From: Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Circulated: _______ _ 
.Recirculated: JAN 3 'Ell 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA'rffl 
No. 75-1278 
Mt. Healthy City School District 




On Writ of Certiorari to 
the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit. 
[December· -, 1976] 
MR. JuSTICK REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
Respondent Doyle sued petitioner Mt. Healthy Board of 
Education in the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of Ohio. Doyle claimed that the Board's refusal 
to renew his contract in 1971 violated his rights under the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution. After a bench trial the District Court held 
that Doyle was entitled to reinstatement with back pay. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the 
judgment, and we granted the Board's petition for certiorari 
to consider an admixture of jurisdictional and constitutional 
claims. 
I 
Although the respondent's complaint asserted jurisdiction 
under both 28 U. S. C. § 1343 and ~8 U. S. C. '§' 1331, the 
District Court rested its jurisdiction only on § 1331. Peti-
tioner's first jurisdictional contention, which we have little 
difficulty disposing of, asserts that the $10,000 amount in 
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The leading case on this point is St. Paul Indemnity Co, 
v. Red Cab Co., 3"03 U.S. 283 (1938), which stated this test: 
" ... The sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the 
claim is apparently made in good faith. It must appear 
to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than 
the Jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal. The in .. 
ability of plantiff to recover an amount adequate to give 
the Court jurisdiction does not show his bad faith or 
oust the jurisdiction." Id., at 288-289. 
We have cited this rule with approval as recently as 
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636, 642 n. 10 (1975), 
and think it requires disposition of the jurisdictional ques-
tion tendered by the petition in favor of the respondent. 
At the time Doyle brought this action for reinstatement and 
$50,000 damages, he had already accepted a job in a different 
school system paying approximately $2,000 per year less 
than he would have earned with Mt. I:1:ealthy Board had 
he been rehired. The District Court in fact award~ Doyle 
compensatory damages in the amount of $5,158 by reason 
of income already lost at the time it ordered his reinstate-
ment. Even if the District Court had chosen to award 
only compensatory damages and not reinstatement, it is far· 
only compensatory damages and not reinstatement, it was far 
from a "legal certainty't at the time of suit that Doyle, 
would not have been entitled to more than $10,000. 
II 
The Board has filed a document entitled "Supplemental 
Authorities''} in which it raises quite a different "jurisdic-
tional" issne than that presented in its petition for certiorari 
and disposed of in the preceding section of this opinion. 
Relying on the District Court opinion in Weathers v. West 
Yuma County School District, 387 F. Supp. 552, 556 (1974), 
the Board contends that even though Doyle may have met 
the jurisdictional amount requirement of § 1331, it may not·. 
Q~ subjected_ to liaQilitY. in this ([~t w<JaU§.~ PoY.le'~ onfsy 
- -
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substantive constitutional claim atises under 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1983. Because it is not a "person" for purposes of § 1983, 
the Board reasons, liability may no more be imposed on it 
where federal jurisdiction is grounded on 28 U. S. C. § 1331 
than where such jurisdiction is grounded on 28 U.S. C. § 1343. 
The District Coµrt avoided this issue by reciting that it 
had not "stated any conclusion on the possible Monroe-
Kenosha problem in this case since it seems that the case 
is properly here as a § 1331 as well as a § 1983 one." App. 
to Pet., at 15a. This reference to our decisions in Monroe v. 
Pa.pe, 365 U. S. 167 (1961), and City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 
412 U. S. 507 (1973) , where it was held that a municipal 
corporation is not a suable "person" under § 1983, raises 
the question whether petitioner Board in this case is suffi-
ciently like the municipal corporations in those cases so 
that it, too, is excluded from § 1983 liapility. 
The quoted statement of the District Court makes clear 
its view that if the jurisdictional basis for the action is 
§ 1331, the limitations contained in 42 U. S. C. § 1983 do not 
apply. The Board argues, on the contr1:1,ry, that since Con-
gress in § 1983 has expressly created a remedy relating to 
violations of constitutional rights under color of state law, 
one who seeks to recover for such violations is bound by the 
limitations contained in ~ 1983 whatever jurisdictional sec-
tion he invokes. 
The questio11 of whether the Board's arguments should 
prevail, or whether as respondent urged in oral argument, 
we should, by analogy to our decision in Bivens v. Six Un-
known Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 U. S. 388 (1971) , imply a cause of action directly 
from the Fourteenth Amendment which would not be sub-
ject to the limitations contained in ~ 1983, is one which 
has never been decided by this Court. Counsel for respond-
ent at oral argument suggested that it is an extremely 
important question and one which should not be decided 
on :this recond. We agree with !l'espondent. 
- -
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The Board has raised this question for the first time in 
a document filed after its reply brief in this Court. Were it 
in truth a contention that the District Court lacked jur-
isdiction, we would be obliged to consider it, even as we 
are obliged to inquire sua sponte whenever a doubt arises 
as to the existence of federal jurisdiction. Liberty Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U. S. 737, 740 (1976); Louis-
ville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley, 211 U. S. 149, 
152 (1908). And if this were a § 1983 action, brought under 
the special jurisdictional provision of 28 U. S. C. § 1343 
which requires no amount in controversy, it would be appro-
priate for this Court to inquire, for jurisdictional purposes, 
whether a statutory action had in fact peen alleged. City of 
Kenosha v. Bruno, supra. However, where an action is brought 
under § 1331, the catch-all federal question provision requir-
ing $10,000 in controversy, jurisdiction is sufficiently est~b-
lished by allegation of a claim under the Comstitution or 
federal statutes, unless it "clearly appears to be immaterial 
and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdic-
tion . ... " Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 682 (1946); 
Montana-Dakota Utilities v. Public Service Co., 341 U. S. 
246, 249 (1951). 
Here respondent alleged that the Board had violated his, 
rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and' 
claimed the jurisdictionally necessary amount of damages. 
The claim .that the Board is a "person" under § 1983, even 
assuming the correctness of the Board's argument that the· 
§ 1331 action is limited by the restrictions of § 1983, is· 
not so patently without merit as to fail the test of Bell 
v. Hood, supra. Therefore, the question as to whether the 
respondent stated a claim for relief under § 1331 is not of' 
the jurisdictional sort which the Court raises on its own 
motion. The related question of whether a school district / 
_is a person for purp~ses of § 1983 is likewise not before. ~s. 
We. leave those q_uest.ions for another day, .and as.§ume, with.-. 
- -
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out deciding, that the respondent could sue under § 1331 
I 
without regard to the limitations imposed by 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1983. 
III 
The District Court found it unnecessary to decide whether 
the Board was entitled to immunity from suit in the federal 
courts under the Eleventh Amendment, because it decided 
that any such immunity had been waived by Ohio statute 
and decisional law. In view of the treatment of waiver 
by a State of its Eleventh Amendment immunity from 
suit in Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 
459, 464--466, we are less sure than was the District Court 
that Ohio had consented to suit against entities such as 
the Board in the federal courts. We pref er to address instead 
the question of whether such an entity had any Eleventh 
Amendment immunity in the first place, since if we conclude 
that it had none it will be unnecessary to reach the ques. 
tion of waiver. 
The bar of the Eleventh Amendment to suit in federal 
courts extends to states and state officials in appropriate 
circumstances, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974); 
Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, supra, but does 
not extend to counties and similar municipal corporations. 
See County of Lincoln v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890); 
Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 717-721 (1973). 
The issue here thus turns on whether the Mt. Healthy 
Board of Education is to be treated as an arm of the State 
partaking of the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity, or 
is instead to be treated as a municipal corporation or other 
political subdivision to which the Eleventh Amendment does 
not extend. The answer depends at least in part upon 
the nature of the entity created by state law. Under Ohio 
law the "state" does not include "political subdivisions," and 
"political subdivisions" do include local school districts. 
Ohio Rev. Code ·§ 2743.01. Petitioner is but one of many 
- -
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local school boards within the State of Ohio. It is subject 
to some guidance from the State Board of Education, Ohio 
Rev. Code § 3301.07, and receives a significant amount of 
money from the State. Ohio Rev. Code § 3317. But local 
school boards have extensive powers to issue bonds, Ohio 
Rev. Code § 133.27, and to levy taxes within certain re-
strictions of state law. Ohio Rev. Code §§ 5705.02, 5705.03, 
5705.192, 5705.194. On balance, the record before us indi-
cates that a local school board such as petitioner is more like 
a county or city than it is like an arm of the State. We 
therefore hold that it was not entitled to assert any Eleventh 
Amendment immunity from suit in the federal courts. 
IV 
Having concluded that respondent's complaint sufficiently 
pleaded jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331, that the Board 
has failed to preserve the issue whether that complaint stated 
a claim upon which relief could be granted against the 
Board, and that the Board is not immune from suit under 
the Eleventh Amendment, we now proceed to consider the 
merits of respondent's claim under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
Doyle was first employed by the Board in 1966. He 
worked under one-year contracts for the first three years, 
and under a two-year contract from 1969 to 1971. In 1969 
he was elected president of the Teachers' Association, in 
which position he worked to expand the subjects of direct 
negotiation between the Association and the Board of Edu-
cation. During Doyle's one-year term as president of the 
Association, and during the succeeding year when he served 
on its executive committee, there was apparently some ten-
sion in relations between the Boa.rd and the Association. 
Beginning early in 1970, Doyle was involved in several 
incidents not directly connected with his role in the Teach.,, 
tm3' Nsociation. 111 onti inst11,ncf.:! , he engaged in fl,n ar~ument 
- -
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with another teacher which culminated in the other teacher's 
slapping him. Doyle subsequently refused to accept an 
apology and insisted upon some punishment for the other 
teacher. His persistence in the matter resulted in the sqs-
pension of both teachers for one day, which WM followed 
by a walkout by a number of other teachers, which in turn 
resulted in the lifting of the suspensions. 
On other occasions, Doyle got into an argument with 
employees of the school cafeteria over the amount of spaghetti 
which had been served him; referred to students, in con-
nection with a disciplinary complaint, as "sons of bitches"; 
and made an obscene gesture to two girls in connection with 
their failure to obey commands made in his capacity as 
cafeteria supervisor. Chronologically the last in the series 
of incidents which respondent was involved in during his 
employment by the Board was a telephone call by him 
to a local radio station. It was the Board's consideration 
of this incident which the court below found to be a violation 
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
In February of 1971, the principal circulated to various 
teachers a memorandum relating to teacher dress and appear-
ance, which was apparently prompted by the view of some 
in the administration that there was a relationship between 
teacher appearance and public support for bond issues. 
Doyle's response to the receipt of the memorandum-on a 
subject which he apparently understood was to be settled 
by joint teacher-administration action- was to convey the 
substance of the memorandum to a disc jockey at W5AI, 
a Cincinnati radio station, who promptly announced the 
adoption of the dress code as a news item. Doyle subse-
quently apologized to the principal, conceding that he should 
have made some prior communication of his criticism to 
the school administration. 
Approximately one month later the superintendent made 
his customary annual :recommendations to the .Eo~d jIB to 
- -
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the rehiring of nontenured teachers. He recommended that 
Doyle not .be rehired. The same recommendation was made 
with respect to nine other teachers in the district, and in 
all instances, including Doyle's, the recommendation was 
adopted by the Board. Shortly after being notified of 
this decision, respondent requested a statement of reasons 
for the Board's actions. He received a statement citing 
"a notable lack of tact in handling professional matters 
which leaves· much doubt as to your sincerity in establishing 
good school relationships." That general statement was fol-
lowed 'by references to the radio station incident and to the 
obscene gesture incident.1 
· The District Court found that all of these incidents had 
in fact occurred. It concluded that respondent Doyle's tele-
phone call to the radio station was "clearly protected by the 
First Amendment," and that because it had played a "sub-
stantial part" in the decision of the Board not to renew 
Doyle's employment, he was entitled to reinstatement with 
backpay. App. to pet., at 12a-13a. The District Court did 
not expressly state what test it was applying in determining 
that the incident in question involved conduct protected 
by the First Amendment, but simply held that the commu-
nication to the radio station was such conduct. The Court. 
of Appeals affirmed in a brief per curiam opinion. 
1 "I. You have shown a notable lack of tact in handling professional 
matters which leaves much doubt as to your sincerity in establishing good 
school relationships. 
"A. You assumed the responsibility to notify W. S. A. I. Radio Station 
in regards to the suggestion of the Board of Education that teachers-
·establish an appropriate dress code for professional people. This raised 
much concern not only within this community, but also in neighboring 
•communities. 
"B. You used obscene gestures to correct students in a situation in th~ 
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Doyle's claims under the First and Fourteenth Amend• 
inents are not defeated by the fact that he did not have 
tenure. Even though he could have been discharged for 
no reason whatever, and had no constitutional right to a 
hearing prior to the decision not to rehire him, Board of 
Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 (1972), he may nonetheless 
establish a claim to reinstatement if the decision not to 
rehire him was made by reason of his exercise of constitu-
tiona1ly protected First Amendment freedoms. Perry v. 
Sinderman, 408 U. S. 593 (1972) . 
That question of whether speech of a government em-
ployee is constitutionally protected expression necessarily 
entails striking "a balance between the interests of 
the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of 
public concern and the interest of the State as an employer, 
in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs 
through its employees." Pickering v. Board of Education, 
391 U. S. 563, 568 (1968). There is no suggestion by the 
Board that Doyle violated any established policy, or that its 
reaction to his communication to the radio station was any-
thing more than an ad hoc response to Doyle's action in mak-
ing the memorandum public. We therefore accept the Dis-
trict Court's finding that the communication was protected 
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. We are not, how-
ever, entirely in agreement with that court's manner of 
reasoning from this finding to the conclusion that Doyle is 
entitled to reinstatement with backpay. 
The District Court made the following "conclusions" cm 
this aspect of the case: 
"(1) If a non-permissible reason, e, g., exercise of 
First Amendment rights, played a substantial part in the 
decision not to renew--even in the face of other per-
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"(2) A non-permissible reason did play a substantial 
part. That is clear from the letter of the Superintendent 
immediately following the Board's decision, which stated 
two reasons--the one, the conversation with the radio 
station clearly protected by the First Amendment. A 
court may not engage in any limitation of First Amend-
ment rights based on 'tact'-that is not to say that 'tact-
fulness' is irrelevant to other issues in this case." App. 
to pet., at 12a-13a. 
At the same time, though, it stated that 
"in fact, as this Court sees it and finds, both the Board 
and the Superintendent were faced with a situation 
in which there did exist in fact reason ... indep~ndent 
of any First Amendment rights or exercise thereof, to 
not extend tenure." App. to pet., at 12a. 
Since respondent Doyle had no tenure, and there was 
therefore not even a state law requirement of "cause" or 
"reason" before a decision could be made not to renew his 
employment, it is not clear what the District Court meant 
by this latter statement. Clearly the Board legally could 
have dismissed respondent had the radio station incident: 
never come to its attention. One plausible meaning of the 
court's statement is tha.t the Board and the Superintendent. 
not only could, but in fact would have reached that decision 
had not the constitutionally protected incident of the tele-
phone call to the radio station occurred. We are thus brought 
to the issue whether, even if that were the case, the fact that 
the protected conduct played a "substantial part" in the 
actual decision not to renew would necessarily amount to a 
constitutional violation justifying remedial action. We think 
that it would not. 
A rule of causation which focuses solely on whether pro- . 
tected conduct played a part, "substantial" or otherwise, in, 
a decision not to rehire, could place an employee in a bet-
t,e_r 1:osttion ~ a re_sult_ of t'ge exercise o{ co_11~_itutioni!.l1~-
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protected conduct than he would have occupied had he 
done nothing. The difficulty with the rule enunciated by 
the District Court is that it would require reinstatement in 
cases where a dramatic and perhaps abrasive incident is in-
evitably on the minds of those responsible for the decision 
to rehire, and does indeed play a part in tha.t decision-
even if the same decision would have been reached had the 
incident not occurred. The constitutional principle at stake 
is sufficiently vindicated if such an employee is placed in no 
worse a position than if he had not engaged in the conduct. 
A borderline or marginal candidate should not have the· 
employment question resolved against him because of con-
stitutionally protected conduct. But that same candidate 
ought not to be able, by engaging in such conduct, to pre-
vent his employer from assessing his performance record 
and reaching a decision not to rehire on the basis of that 
record, simply because the protected conduct makes the 
employer more certain of the correctness of its decision. 
This is especially true where, as the District Court observed 
was the case here, the current decision to rehire will accord 
"tenure." The long term consequences of an award 
of tenure are of great moment both to the employee and 
to the employer. They are too significant for us to hold 
that the Board in this case would be precluded, because 
it considered constitutionally protected conduct in deciding 
not to rehire Doyle, from attempting to prove to a trier of 
fact that quite apart from such conduct Doyle's record was 
such that he would not have been rehired in any event. 
In other areas of constitutional law, this Court has found 
it necessary to formulate a test of causation which distin-
guishes between a result caused by a constitutional violation 
and one not so caused. We think those are instructive in 
formulating the test to be applied here. 
In Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596 (1944), the Court· 
held that even though the first confession given by a defend-
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not prevent the State from using a second confession ob-
tained 12 hours later if the coercion surrounding the first 
confession had been sufficiently dissipated as to m&ke the 
second .confession voluntary. In Wong Sun v. United States, 
371 U. S. 471, 491 (1963), the Court was willing to assume 
that a defendant's arrest had been unlawful, but to hold 
that "the connection between the arrest and the statement 
given several days later had 'become so attem~ated as to 
dissipate the taint.' Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 
338, 341." Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U. S: 790, 796 
(1970), held that even though a confession be assumed 
to have been involuntary in the constitutional sense of the 
word, a guilty plea entered over a month later met the test 
for the voluntariness of such a plea. The Court in Parker 
relied on ,the same quoted langua.ge from Nardone, supra, 
as did the Court in Wong Sun, supra. While the type of 
causation on which the taint cases turn may differ some-
what from that we apply here, those cases do suggest that 
the proper test to apply in the present context is one which 
likewise protects against the invasion of constitutional rights 
without commanding undesirable consequences not necessary 
to the assura.nee of those rights. 
Initially, in this case, the burden was properly plaaed 
upon respondent to show that his conduct W¥ constitu-
tionally protected, and that this conduct was a "substantial 
factor"-or, to put it in other words, that it was a "motivat-
ing factor" 2 in the Board's decision not to rehire him. Re-
spondent having carried that burden, however, the District 
Court should have gone on to determine whether the Board 
had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that it 
would have reached the same decision as to respondent's re-
employment even in the absence of the protected condtJct. 
2 See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Deuelop-
rnent Corp., NQ. 75-616 (December-, 1976), at-.. 
' - -
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We cannot tell from the District Court opinion and con-
clusions, nor from the opinion of the Court of Appeals 
affirming the judgment of the District Court, what con-
clusion those courts would have reached had they applied 
this test. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is there-
fore vacated, and the case remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
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C H A MBERS O F 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST ✓ 
January 3, 1977 
Re: No. 75-1278 - Mt. Healthy City Board of 
Education v. Doyle 
Dear John: 
I am quite willing to revise the sentence at the 
bottom of page 12 to carry out the suggestion contained 
in your letter of December 22nd, and would suggest the 
following revised version of that sentence: 
"Respondent having carried that burden, 
however, the District Court should have 
gone on to determine whether the Board 
had shown by a preponderance of the 
evidence that it would have reached the 
same decision as to respondent's re-
employment even in the absence of the 
protected conduct." 
The suggestion contained in the second paragraph of your 
letter of that date is, as you indicate, a little harder 
to incorporate into the opinion. Since by hypothesis under 
our analysis the District Court may order reinstatement only 
where it concludes that the Board would have re-employed 
respondent had the protected conduct not occurred, certainly 
a fairly strong argument may be made that reinstatement is 
- ...... -- -
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necessary in most such cases in order to avoid penalizing 
a teacher for exercising First Amendment rights. I fully 
agree with you, however, that federal courts should retain 
a good deal of flexibility in order not to reach absurd 
results in such cases, and if you could suggest some language 
which would not lose me the votes of some who have already 
joined, I would be glad to give it a try. 
Sincerel~~ 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
- -
.§up-unu <!}omi .of tlrr ~fth .:§htlr,a, 
:.a,S<4mgion. IB. <!}. 20ffeJ1, 
January 3, 1977 
✓ 
Re: 75-1278 - Mt. Healthy City School Dist. etc. 
v. Doyle 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me . 
Mr, Justice Rehnquist 
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